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7. General conditions
(1) A stabilisation power may be exercised in respect of a bank only if -
(a) the PRA is satisfied that Condition 1 is met, and
(b) the Bank of England is satisfied that Conditions 2, 3 and 4 are met.
(2) Condition 1 is that the bank is failing or likely to fail.
(3) Condition 2 is that, having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that (ignoring the stabilisation powers) action will be taken by or in respect of the bank that will result in Condition 1 ceasing to be met.
(4) Condition 3 is that the exercise of the power is necessary having regard to the public interest in the advancement of one or more of the special resolution objectives.
(5) Condition 4 is that one or more of the special resolution objectives would not be met to the same extent by the winding up of the bank (whether under Part 2 or otherwise).
(5A) The PRA must treat Condition 1 as met if satisfied that it would be met but for financial assistance provided by -
(a) the Treasury, or
(b) the Bank of England,
disregarding ordinary market assistance offered by the Bank on its usual terms.